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SUMMARY 
Positive experience of EU membership has reassured Poland of 
the merits of an integration model based on social solidarity and 
a free market, which it wishes to continue. Poland’s position fo-
cuses on three main areas: cohesion policy, Common Agricultural 
Policy and EU Neighbourhood Policy. It seeks to retain these, 
though receptive to change in response to new challenges facing 
the EU (e.g. demographic change, sustainable development, and 
alleviating effects of globalization). In view of the new EU tasks, 
Poland does not favour further reduction in the EU budget. De-
bate could be made more constructive by splitting off discussion 
of the revenue side. Greater autonomy for the own-resources sys-
tem would facilitate debate and allow needful financial develop-
ment of the new European policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Poland has yet to present an official posi-
tion paper on the EU budget review en-
visaged for 2008–9, although this was 
expected in the spring of 2008.
1
 So the 
thinking process has started, and there 
are published expert opinions and state-
ments from decision-makers that can 
serve as a guide to the Polish view and 
Warsaw’s preferences. The main priorities 
for Poland have been outlined in a press 
release on preparation of the official po-
sition. With the debate on the future 
shape of the budget, Warsaw considers 
the issue to be strongly connected to 
views on the overall future of the EU. 
There are two main priorities outlined: 
(1) the principle of solidarity in internal-
market issues and in foreign policy; and 
(2) the issue of new instruments in EU 
neighbourhood policy that express Po-
land’s interest in maintaining close rela-
tions with Ukraine. As for own resources, 
it is unclear yet whether Warsaw will 
support the introduction of a European 
tax alongside the present system based 
on national contributions. However, there 
is a document on the Polish vision for 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
2
 
This shows that Poland, along with 
France, will remain an active participant 
on the debate of CAP reform, determined 
to retain the main structure, though open 
to constructive changes. 
This paper is based mainly on expert 
opinion and only partly on official docu-
                                                   
1 Europejskie Serwis Polskiej Agencji Prasowej. 
January 2008. 
2 Polska wizja…. 2007. 
ments. The analysis seeks to further an 
understanding of the facts and circum-
stances that affect Polish motives when 
arguing during the negotiations. It tries 
to summarize the basic facts upon which 
the Polish position will be formulated, 
along with the main lines of argument 
likely to shape the future Polish position 
on the EU budget. The structure is as 
follows. Chapter 1 describes Poland’s gen-
eral priorities and the principles behind 
its stance. Chapter 2 briefly describes 
possible changes in EU cohesion policy 
and how these might influence the Polish 
position on reforming it after 2014. 
Chapter 3 turns to the plans for reform-
ing CAP and the Polish view of these. Fi-
nally, there is a summary of the main 
findings and conclusions. 
1) GENERAL PRIORITIES  
The enlargement process has proved a 
success for the EU. An integration model 
based upon the principle of solidarity and 
a free market has acted as a “soft 
force” and catalyst behind the transfor-
mation process.
3
 The incentives for the 
acceding member-states to implement nec-
essary reforms and the expectations that 
they will do so have given rise to an 
enlarged area of security, stability and 
higher living standards. Poland has en-
joyed higher growth rates, disinflation, 
export impetus, and dynamic investment 
since accession. The public has been reas-
sured about the merits of EU membership 
by net benefits to the country’s budget, 
development prospects raised by the 
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6 
structural funds, and new job opportuni-
ties in other member-states.
4
 So Polish 
opinion is based on positive experience in 
the early years of membership, generating 
higher economic growth, lower unem-
ployment, and greater scope in the Euro-
pean economic sphere. For Poland as a 
converging country, the EU has largely 
brought solutions to her problems, not 
become part of the problem, as in many 
European countries. So it would be in 
Poland’s interests to retain the present 
integration model based upon solidarity 
(as an economic integration model and in 
foreign policy) and a free market. 
However, there are discernible threats 
to this model. Enlargement may be a so-
lution in some areas of the European in-
tegration process, but it has become a 
source of deep crisis in others. There are 
fears generated by immigration from 
Eastern Europe, delocalization of Western 
companies, and unsolved structural prob-
lems in the euro zone, which have weak-
ened the legitimacy of the Union in soci-
ety’s eyes and changed public views of it. 
“The EU, hitherto viewed as a community 
able to solve national problems in a 
globalized world, has turned into a 
community ‘Trojan horse’, weakening the 
nation-state and destabilizing the basis for 
security and social protection for the 
people on a national level.”
5
 So as Poland 
devises its position paper on the future 
shape of the EU budget and the EU in 
general, it must display sympathy and 
understanding for the reasons behind this 
clear division in the basic view of the EU, 
between the “new” and the “old” mem-
ber-states. 
Review of the EU budget can act as a 
catalyst for wider debate on the future 
                                                   
4 Trzy lata…. 2007. 
5 Serafin 2007. 
model of the European Union. Should it 
be a model of a “liberal Europe” or a 
“social Europe”? The best way to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the EU in the 
public’s eyes is to enhance structural re-
forms and achieve higher growth and 
level of employment. Structural reforms 
must start at national level, but there 
cannot be silence about the economic and 
social problems of a common market at 
EU level either. The problems of the los-
ers of liberalization, e.g. aging industries 
and the least qualified workers, must be 
addressed at the EU level as well. In-
creasing the level of innovation by raising 
R&D expenditures helps the EU to sim-
plify the challenges of globalization and 
to balance competitiveness. They do not, 
however, answer the fears of those who 
lose on globalization. At the EU level, a 
more active approach is needed to handle 
the conflict between the supporters of 
liberalization and supporters of the tradi-
tional social model. One answer could be 
to follow the example of the European 
Globalization Adjustment Fund and ad-
dress the problems of certain social 
groups that lose by the globalization 
processes or the deepening of EU integra-
tion. Especially important will be discus-
sions on the cohesion policy instruments, 
especially target 2. The European Social 
Fund serves to some extent as an in-
strument for compensating outplacement, 
which points in the same direction. 
The Polish view is to support these 
new instruments and accepts new expen-
diture items. It is understood very well 
that the EU faces new challenges, such as 
rising energy prices, demographic 
changes, sustainable development, or alle-
viating globalization effects. So the debate 
has to address the questions of (1) what 
challenges the EU should try to meet, 
and (2) how current EU policies can be 
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adjusted to comply with these political 
priorities. The pertinent question when 
analysing the current EU instruments is 
what changes we want in various policies 
so that they respond better to our needs. 
The Polish position will comply with 
the importance attached to addressing the 
new challenges facing the EU. However, it 
has also been said that the budgetary 
expenditures required for the new policy 
instruments should not entail abolishing 
or decreasing expenditures for present 
policies, especially not those for cohesion 
of growth and employment, or on CAP. 
Poland considers all expenditure items 
currently financed from the EU budget to 
be important. The question of whether to 
abolish or retain the present policies 
should be raised in a context of 
analysing the value they add on a 
European level. The value-added test 
might take a twin-track approach. (1) It 
would be reasonable to carry out a 
subsidiarity test on whether member-states 
can finance and conduct certain policies. 
Less affluent member-states would be 
unable to finance cohesion policy or CAP 
from their national budgets. But the 
European budget has only secondary 
importance for expenditure on 
competitiveness (R and D, education) or 
external relations. (2) It would be 
reasonable to assess the value added of 
EU spending through such notions as 
economies of scale, spillovers and related 
externalities, and compliance with EU 
political priorities. But it has to be em-
phasized that the EU budget finances 
tasks that appear at Community level, 
aim to deepen integration in the common 
market, and are intended to benefit all 
member-states. So the revenue and ex-
penditure sides of the budget do not ex-
press national interests. They serve (or 
should serve) objectives to meet at Com-
munity level. 
The principle of solidarity should not 
cease to function within the regional pol-
icy. Warsaw finds it important to work 
out new policy instruments in connection 
with competitiveness, such as for R and 
D objectives. But Warsaw finds it inevita-
ble that these new instruments will widen 
the development gap between EU mem-
ber-states and regions. 
The EU budget review is an important 
step in the debate on the future shape of 
Europe. It would also be important in 
that debate, though, to tackle the issue of 
budget resources. The budget itself repre-
sents less than 1 per cent of the GNI of 
the EU. Although the number of member-
states has increased, the size of the 
budget has shrunk. Poland would find 
any further reduction in the budget un-
acceptable. Most expert opinion sees be-
tween 1.25 and 1.5 per cent of EU GNI 
as an ideal budget size—a relatively 
small increase over the present size. The 
EU has to be redefined, but sufficient 
means to perform its tasks must be pro-
vided.  
Polish experts find the present own-
resources system overly dependent on 
national contributions. As a result, 
member-states perceive the EU budget 
through juste retour lenses. Paradoxically, 
a GNI-based own-resources system leads 
to numerous corrective mechanisms being 
introduced, so that the burden of 
financing the EU budget is unevenly 
shared between member-states. According 
to a Deloitte Consulting study for the 
European Parliament's Committee on 
Budgets,
6
 Portugal contributed 0.96 per 
cent of GDP to the EU budget in 2005, 
                                                   
6 Deloitte 2007. 
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while the UK contributed only 0.54 per 
cent (TOR excluded). The average 
contribution for the EU25 was equivalent 
to 0.8 per cent of GDP. There is a risk 
that a GNI-based system may lead to a 
situation in which the relative 
contributions of member-states correlate 
inversely with national wealth. Experts 
agree that the introduction of genuine 
own-resource would make the EU budget 
more autonomous. The official position, 
however, is not yet known. It is unclear  
whether Poland would support the 
introduction of such own-resource or 
what kind of resource is envisaged. As 
for the payment position of member-
states, Poland firmly emphasizes that all 
correctives should be abolished.  
It is widely thought in Poland among 
experts that the joint discussions on EU 
budgetary expenditures and revenues are 
drifting inevitably towards a juste retour 
logic and political deadlock. Hiving off 
the discussion of the revenue side would 
be more constructive. Greater autonomy 
of the own-resources system would facili-
tate future discussion and allow for the 
necessary financial development of new 
European policies. Giving up discussion of 
narrow national net-payment positions is 
a necessary precondition for developing 
the EU horizontal issues. 
The Polish position reflects the outlook 
of a converging country for which eco-
nomic cohesion is a priority that can be 
achieved more easily thanks to EU re-
gional policy instruments. Agriculture is 
an important economic and social factor 
in the Polish economy, and so Warsaw 
will not be indifferent to reform of CAP.  
The general Polish objective of retain-
ing the integration model based on soli-
darity and a free market can only be 
kept up if the model has social backing 
from the whole community. So it must be 
clear to Polish negotiators that a com-
promise solution is needed to change the 
general public perceptions of the EU. The 
Polish position will have to be devised 
carefully if it is to achieve the basic aims 
of Polish foreign policy of enhanced ex-
ternal security, faster convergence of the 
economy, and an increased political role 
in Europe. There is hope of this being 
understood by the official Polish negotia-
tors, as politics in Poland since the elec-
tions of October 2007 have moved to-
wards stabilization, while demagogic ten-
dencies and extremism have been mar-
ginalized. This is a favourable turn for 
those who favour the EU, as a Polish 
stance based on facts instead of feelings 
can be formed. This, however, will not 
preclude the Polish negotiators from 
fighting bitterly for their country’s inter-
ests. But more could mean less in this 
case. Keeping up actual policies could 
mean more than achieving a higher share 
in a policy instrument that soon ceases to 
function. 
There are three main priority areas 
for the Polish government: the future of 
cohesion policy, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and the EU Neighbourhood In-
strument. These are the subjects of the 
next chapter. 
2) THE FUTURE OF COHESION 
POLICY  
Enlargement of the EU with less devel-
oped East European countries caused ten-
sions well before the first wave of such 
enlargement in 2004. Two main policy 
instruments were basically under attack, 
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one being the EU cohesion policy instru-
ment, representing the second largest 
slice of the EU budget (35 per cent in 
2007–13, reaching €308 billion).7 Half 
this sum is earmarked for the new mem-
ber-states, whose level of development 
measured in GDP per capita remains well 
under the EU average. Every fifth euro 
has been put at the disposal of cohesion 
policy intervention in Poland,
8
 which 
means that Poland has taken the role 
previously belonging to Spain, as the 
largest beneficiary of this EU policy in-
strument. It seems clear to the Polish side 
that the country must take an active role 
in the debate on this.  
2.1. The main reasons for    
future reforms 
The prosperity gap between the more de-
veloped EU member-states and the newly 
acceded ones in Eastern Europe has been 
significant and will remain so over the 
2014–20 budgetary period. This means 
that the relative payment situation of the 
old EU member-states will change radi-
cally, especially with the accession of Bul-
garia and Romania, and still more if the 
possible future inclusions of Croatia or 
Turkey are considered. Simulations of 
various scenarios have been prepared by 
                                                   
7 It has to be considered that this figure of 35 
per cent of the EU budget represents only a 
small, 0.37 per cent proportion of the GNI of the 
EU, which does not seem much to devote to one 
of the main EU objectives, of increasing cohesion 
and reducing regional differences at European 
level, in pursuit of a more integrated European 
market. 
8 Przyszlosc…. 2006, p 12. 
the research unit at the European Inte-
gration Committee in Warsaw.
9
 
The basic scenarios are as follows: 
If an unchanged cohesion policy were 
applied to the EU27, the expenditures of 
the “cohesion countries” would decrease 
by about 30 per cent and that of the 
EU10 increase by about 30 per cent. The 
biggest winners would be Bulgaria and 
Romania, whose allocations could increase 
by 70–80 per cent. The sum earmarked 
for cohesion policy would be 0.34 per 
cent of EU27 GNI. The share of the EU15 
would decrease from 48 per cent to 33 
per cent, while the allocation of the EU12 
could rise from the present €175 billion 
in 2007–13 to €239 billion in 2014–20. 
The biggest losers would be Spain, 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, and the big-
gest winners Poland (up €25 billion), 
Romania (up €15 billion) and Bulgaria 
(up €5.3 billion). This would also mean 
expenditure was concentrated on the 
poorest countries, which could strengthen 
the approach of moving regional policy 
to a national level. 
Under the scenario where real appre-
ciation of national currency is excluded 
from the calculation, allocations to the 
EU10 could reach 18.5 per cent (as op-
posed to 30 per cent under the basic 
scenario). Poland could be entitled to 
€80.5 billion (as opposed to €92 billion 
euro). 
A scenario taking into account the ac-
cession of Turkey would add a further 
increase in the sum for the cohesion pol-
icy instrument equivalent to 0.43 per cent 
of EU28 GNI. The allocation to the EU15 
would decrease even more, from 48 per 
cent to 25. 
                                                   
9 Urzad Komitetu Integracji, Departament Strategii 
i Analiz. 
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With the accession of the ten and even 
more after that of Bulgaria and Romania, 
the “statistical effect” of post-enlargement 
macroeconomic reference data would 
worsen the situation for several regions. 
Some regions of the EU15 hitherto eligible 
for aid would no longer qualify in the 
EU27. Although these regions were not 
developing faster than the EU average, 
the statistical effect would be to mark 
them as “phasing-out” regions. According 
to Polish calculations, this effect could 
result in a 42 per cent decrease in the 
allocation for the EU15 during the 2014–
20 budgetary period.  
Retaining the present framework of 
cohesion policy in 2014–20 could boost 
the idea in several member-states of re-
nationalizing the policy—returning to a 
national aspect instead of finding a solu-
tion on a Community level. Despite the 
qualification change in some regions, 
there are still unsolved development prob-
lems in some more developed countries 
(e.g. the Mezzogiorno in Italy, East Ger-
man regions, some Greek regions, and 
some regions in Spain) that would curb 
initiatives to renationalize cohesion policy.  
Statistics and empirical research
10
 show 
convergence in the EU at national level, 
but an unsatisfactory convergence process 
at regional level. Two considerations ap-
ply when trying to decide whether cohe-
sion policy functions properly or not: (1) 
its effect on economic backwardness, and 
(2) its impact on regional development. 
But data on unsatisfactory convergence at 
regional level has to be handled with 
care. First, there is the natural tendency 
for economic activity to concentrate. Then 
there is the relatively small spending on 
cohesion-policy instruments (0.37 per cent 
EU GNI in 2007–13). It can be concluded 
                                                   
10 European Commission 2004b; Grosse 2002. 
that the slow convergence at regional 
level or weak development performance 
by certain regions hitherto eligible for 
structural instruments do not necessarily 
support show that the instrument is use-
less. Regional disparities might be larger 
still but for this EU policy.  
The question must be, on the other 
hand, tackled upon which areas these 
assets should be spent on. Nearly 30 per 
cent of cohesion policy funds have been 
spent on transport infrastructure. Here, 
researchers agree that such funds rein-
force economic concentration instead of 
cohesion. While the development of tele-
communication infrastructure, on the 
other hand, can do more for regional 
cohesion.    
2.2. Possible changes in     
cohesion policy after 2013 
It is clear from the above that retaining 
cohesion policy in its present form would 
bring about a clear shift of fund alloca-
tion from the EU15 to the new member-
states. The European Commission puts 
special emphasis on the “visibility” of in-
terventions within cohesion policy at a 
regional level. This is how the modifica-
tion of the Berlin methodology or the 
creation of a stronger objective 2 in 
2007–13 can be interpreted. There are 
three possible changes
11
 to be expected 
from the Commission side: (1) further re-
duction of capping; (2) creation of spe-
cial earmarked funds for member-states 
like Spain, Portugal or Greece; (3) in-
creasing the budget for modernization 
tasks (i.e. such criteria as innovation). 
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11
There could be new eligibility criteria in-
cluded, such as overcoming development 
difficulties within the euro zone, for the 
benefit of such countries as Portugal, It-
aly, or Spain. There have also been pro-
posals for basing eligibility for cohesion 
funds on something other than GDP per 
capita, such as unemployment rates, de-
velopment delay, transformation problems 
of the economy, etc.   
Cohesion policy often serves as a tool 
to improve the relative net position of a 
member-state’s budget. This requirement 
might become less dominant if monies 
were earmarked for such countries. Fur-
thermore, decisions in the field of CAP 
and the own-resources system would be 
very important for the cohesion-policy 
project. 
A national approach was proposed by 
a group of countries (the UK, the Neth-
erlands and Sweden) during the negotia-
tions on the budgetary framework for 
2007–13; it was suggested that an ap-
proach based on the convergence of 
member-states, not regions, should apply 
to cohesion policy. The regional/national 
debate will certainly be an important fac-
tor in the budget review as well. 
2.3. Conclusions for Poland 
to draw 
Polish calculations show the less devel-
oped new member-states would gain most 
if cohesion policy stayed in its present 
form. Poland, as in the 2007–13 budget-
ary period, would be a major beneficiary. 
On the other hand, the marked imbal-
ance in funding between old and new 
member-states could encourage a national 
approach and limit cohesion-policy spend-
ing. 
It is not yet clear what the official 
standpoint of other new member-states 
will be. An alliance with Romania and 
Bulgaria seems feasible, and to a smaller 
extent with the Visegrád countries. Some 
new member states, however, have al-
ready expressed support for a national 
approach in cohesion policy. This is be-
cause retention of the regional approach 
would favour larger member-states, 
which always have less developed regions 
qualifying for funds, while the regional 
differences in smaller countries are bal-
anced by the statistical factor.  
It may seem that the Polish standpoint 
is a comfortable one, as the present 
shape of cohesion policy favours Poland. 
But analysis shows that other actors will 
definitely end up by changing it. So Po-
land may face a dilemma: agree with 
changes in eligibility criteria to balance 
the allocations while retaining the present 
cohesion policy, or support the present 
rules and framework, which would very 
probably lead to an introduction of the 
national approach. Expert opinion tends 
to favour the former.   
2.4. Priorities for the Polish 
position in cohesion policy 
The Polish position should obviously take 
these facts and calculations into account. 
Here is a summary of Warsaw’s priori-
ties in cohesion policy: 
Poland will continue to support reten-
tion of EU cohesion policy. Continuing on 
the basis of the solidarity rule and the 
regional dimension would decrease re-
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gional disparities, increase cohesion in the 
common market, and bring further bene-
fits to all member-states in the form of 
faster economic growth and improvements 
on the labour market. This has to be put 
over as a positive-sum game, benefiting 
all EU member-states. 
Poland would oppose any proposal to 
renationalize cohesion policy, which might 
be motivated by the desire of some 
member-states gradually to decrease its 
scope or even eliminate it. This would 
threaten Polish interests. It is also impor-
tant for Poland that the policy considers 
all member-states, not just the newly ac-
ceded ones. 
Poland will support the proposal to in-
crease allocations linked to new chal-
lenges facing all member-states, or crite-
ria that have a high value added at 
Community level. e.g. trans-border coop-
eration, trans-European infrastructure 
networks, challenges linked to completion 
of the Lisbon strategy, challenges of 
globalization and further market liberali-
zation, and innovation needs for global 
competitiveness.  
Allocation within cohesion policy, how-
ever, should later concentrate on Objec-
tive 1 areas, while developing operations 
in terms of funds and orientation needs, 
in relation to Objectives 2 and 3. New 
initiatives such as Interreg or Leader 
should also be considered.  
Poland would like to promote further 
decentralization of EU cohesion policy, 
particularly by delegating the main com-
petencies to the regions. 
Poland would support simplification of 
the bureaucracy in managing cohesion 
policy, but without any decrease in high-
standard monitoring and evaluation of 
public funds within the EU. Increasing 
visibility should not mean more bureauc-
racy, but shorter procedures.  
Poland would oppose reducing the 
present share of cohesion policy in the 
EU budget. 
3) CAP REFORM 
Reform of the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy was already a major issue of debate 
during the negotiations on the financial 
prospects for 2007–13. The review of the 
conformity of CAP with the assumptions 
of the reform of it set forth in Luxem-
bourg in 2003 (the health check) and the 
EU budget review in 2008–9 will become 
catalysts for the debate on its future 
shape. A prominent role will be played 
by the WTO negotiations on liberalization 
of trade in food and agricultural prod-
ucts. Also making a major impact will be 
changing social expectations in member-
states on food security, food quality, etc. 
So fundamental decisions on the post-
2013 shape of cap can be expected in 
the next few years. Poland, as a major 
CAP beneficiary and a country where ag-
riculture represents an important eco-
nomic and social factor, is preparing to 
continue as a major player in the de-
bates. 
Many CAP opponents stress the high 
costs of this policy instrument, which ab-
sorbs 47 per cent of the common EU 
budget. Agriculture remains the economic 
sector to receive the greatest support, 
even though its share of GDP is very low 
(1.3 per cent in the EU15 and 2.2 per 
cent in the acceding EU10 in 2005). As a 
social factor, the role of this economic 
sector is decreasing, though still impor-
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tant in certain areas. The proportion of 
the population it employed in 2004 was 
3.8 per cent in EU15, but 12.5 per cent 
in EU10. From the data it is clear there 
is a significant difference in the role 
played by agriculture in the EU15 and in 
the newly acceded countries. 
However, enlargement has brought 
progress to the agricultural sector in all 
member-states, facilitating trade within 
the EU and supporting modernization of 
agriculture in the new member-states.
12
 
So with the accession of the EU10, Euro-
pean agriculture has grown in impor-
tance in terms of area, production, and 
number of farmers. The fears of negative 
effects of enlargement on the agricultural 
sector have proved unfounded. Neverthe-
less, the productivity of the EU10 remains 
distinctly lower than that of the rest of 
the EU. There are significant differences 
within the EU10, as well, Poland being 
the country traditionally representing the 
least productive results in agricultural 
production.
13
  
Agriculture employs 17.4 per cent of 
the workforce but contributes only 3.8 
per cent to GDP, reflecting relatively low 
sector productivity. Agricultural land, 
unlike industry, remained in private 
hands under communism. Polish farming 
still shows a high degree of fragmenta-
tion of holdings, a high number of peo-
ple employed, a prevalence of soils of 
average or low agricultural suitability, 
and relatively low use of industrial-scale 
means of production. The average hold-
ing of 12 ha is well under the EU aver-
age and 35 per cent of holdings are un-
der 5 ha. Poland is the eighth largest 
                                                   
12 European Commission 2006. 
13 The comparison omits the newly acceded Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. 
recipient of CAP allocations, but this share 
could increase after 2013.   
Polish experts often stress the added 
value that CAP brings.
14
 If the EU had no 
agricultural policy at Community level 
there would be no single market for 
food products. The same applies to equal 
competition conditions, protection of the 
natural environment, and the ability to 
react rapidly to crises. Poland, in view of 
the importance of these advantages, gives 
top priority to maintaining the Commu-
nity character of agricultural policy.  
However, the Polish stance takes full 
account of the need to alter the shape of 
CAP and includes support for changing 
this policy instrument. Two main scenar-
ios have been advanced by experts of the 
Strategic and Analysis Unit of the Euro-
pean Integration Office.
15
 The “evolution-
ary approach” would include such meas-
ures as introducing full separation of 
payments from production (decoupling), 
increasing the obligatory modulation rate 
of direct payments, limiting the amount 
of payments to the largest farms, gradu-
ally limiting interventions on agricultural 
markets, and moderately liberalizing 
trade. In the “liberal scenario” envisages 
eradicating direct payments and interven-
tions on agricultural markets such as 
milk quotas, as well as significantly liber-
alizing world trade in farm products. 
The optimum scenario for European agri-
culture would seem to be an intermediate 
version.  
Future agricultural policy, according to 
Polish experts, should: 
∗ create equal competition conditions for 
European agricultural producers, ena-
                                                   
14 Burkiewicz, Grochowska and Hardt 2007. 
15 UKIE: Urzad Komitetu Integracji, Departament 
Analiz i Strategii. 
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bling a single market for agricultural 
products to function; 
∗ not be fully subject to market rules, 
but further supported by the EU, due 
to the specific character of the sector; 
∗ be performed at Community level, with 
common rules and financing. 
The instruments of the CAP system, 
however, should undergo simplification, 
and at the same time, there should be an 
attempt to address the new challenges 
facing European agriculture since Po-
land’s accession, and in the light of fur-
ther liberalization of agricultural markets. 
It is also clear from the above that 
the new obligations related to environ-
mental protection and veterinary condi-
tions preclude a further reduction of CAP. 
The present size of the agricultural 
budget is the result of current reforms, 
thanks to which the policy has become 
more effective. 
The following sub-sections summarize 
the Polish position on the main areas of 
debate about the future shape of CAP.  
3.1. Indirect payments 
According to the Polish position,
16
 the 
health check on CAP should lead to 
changes in the system that serve the in-
terests of all member-states and can be 
backed up by the actual situations in 
them. Any simple “wish to slim the EU 
budget” or position against world trade-
liberalization trends cannot serve as a 
reason for changing the present system 
of direct payments. In line with this gen-
eral view, Poland would support a fur-
ther shift in the main source of support 
                                                   
16 Polska wizja…. 2007.  
within CAP to the first pillar: direct pay-
ments. Although the second pillar should 
gain importance, it should not be at the 
expense of the first. Poland would stress 
that support to farm income should con-
tinue to be effected through direct pay-
ments under the first pillar of CAP. Any 
reduction in direct support under the 
first pillar should be offset by expanding 
instruments to improve competitiveness 
under the second pillar.  
Under the direct-payment system, a 
uniform rate should be applied to all 27 
member-states. This would ensure uni-
form competition terms and simpler and 
more transparent management of the 
funds. 
The Single Area Payment System intro-
duced by Poland in 2004 is unlinked to 
production, and so not in contravention 
of competition terms. A change to the 
Single Payment Scheme (SPS) would add 
challenges and burdens for Poland, such 
as: a costly and complicated IT system, a 
management system for direct payments, 
preparation of farmers, and an adminis-
trative and advisory team to run the 
scheme. The Polish position would be that 
it was reasonable to allow the present 
system of direct payments (SAPS) to apply 
to new member-states until 2013.
17
  
3.2. Modulation 
The modulation mechanism introduced 
under the EU financial structures fulfils a 
role of transferring resources from the 
                                                   
17 According to the legal arrangements, new 
member-states may apply the SAPS up to the end 
of 2010 (Romania and Bulgaria up to 2011), with 
possibilities of extension. In the latter case, there 
will be the financial sanctions that freeze direct 
payments at 70 per cent. 
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first to the second CAP pillar (i.e. from 
single payments to agricultural area de-
velopment). An important argument for 
this is that it helps farmers with pro-
grammes for development plans rather 
than with single payments. With new 
member-states, the modulation criterion is 
not compulsory so long as the full level 
of direct payments (end of phasing-in 
process) is attained. The Polish position is 
that funds from modulation should be 
applied on a wider scale, to decrease 
differentiation among farm areas in the 
least developed regions of member-states. 
Poland would accept only with reser-
vations the further increase in modulation 
from 5 to 10 per cent proposed by rep-
resentatives of the European Commission. 
This would place extra burdens on the 
national budget (resources from CAP II 
require co-financing) and make available 
only low-level funding for cross-country 
allocations.  
3.3. Cross-compliance 
The political aim of introducing a cross-
compliance mechanism is to create a sys-
tem of controlling and sanctioning farm-
ers in line with the expectations of EU 
societies. Only farmers who meet the 
standards can qualify for direct payments 
in full within CAP. Farmers from the new 
member-states should be handled on 
other terms. So Poland and other new 
member-states would find it reasonable to 
introduce cross-compliance standards at 
the same rate as direct payments increase 
to the full level. The mechanism should 
only apply fully when Poland also gets 
100 per cent payments within CAP I, in 
2013.  
The aim of new member-states is not 
to arrange some derogation from the 
cross-compliance mechanism, but to en-
sure a fair, comparable situation among 
member-states. Poland would even accept 
a gradual introduction, starting in 2009, 
but with a two-year transition for apply-
ing various packages in Clause III (A. 
2009/B. 2011/C. 2013).   
3.4. Decoupling 
The various payment systems used in the 
common market confuse competition 
terms in the Community. Poland attaches 
importance to making the payment system 
independent of production (decoupling) 
and used in all member-states at the 
same time, with uniform support.  
3.5. Market instruments 
Poland has huge potential for milk pro-
duction. At present, there is booming 
demand on global markets and increasing 
prices obtainable for milk products, so 
that Poland should also try to achieve 
higher than present referential rates for 
production (milk quota). However, it is 
also understood that further liberalization 
of the agro-food trade under the Doha 
Round and further negotiations under the 
WTO will compel the EU to eliminate in-
tervention mechanisms. This has served so 
far the purpose of supporting market 
prices, including production quotas, espe-
cially milk quotas. EU policy should sup-
port this process, while being conducive 
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to evolutionary liberalization of world 
trade. 
With the aim of stabilizing the Euro-
pean agro-food market, Poland should 
try to benefit from export refunds for as 
long as possible, especially in the most 
sensitive sectors (e.g. cereals, meat and 
milk). 
Poland will probably go for maintain-
ing all intervention instruments in their 
present form, even if they have not been 
used for a long time. In crises that are 
not without grounds in the light of trade 
liberalization, such instruments could act 
as safety net. A new crisis-management 
system needs devising to reduce the use 
of market-intervention tools in the EU 
market. 
3.6. Budget 
The need to change the present shape of 
the budget is very well understood by the 
Polish side, which agrees that it should 
be reshaped in accordance with the new 
challenges facing the EU. In this respect 
CAP will be an important issue during the 
budget review. The expenditures of the 
European budget, however, should be 
looked at from a wider perspective, as 
part of public expenditure as a whole, 
and this will again be of special impor-
tance in relation to CAP. The new chal-
lenges that face EU agricultural policy 
call for further changes in order to re-
spond better to globalization and social 
expectations. Poland well understands the 
need for change in this area. 
On the other hand Poland opposes any 
such kind of change that would further 
reduce the expenditures within CAP, or 
due to which the common agricultural 
policy would lose its community charac-
ter. 
During the debates on modernizing the 
Community budget, some have empha-
sized that the easiest solution with the 
direct payments would be to transfer the 
financing of them to national budgets. 
Re-nationalizing the financing of agricul-
ture, however, would place a big burden 
of costs on the least developed member-
states. National co-financing would not be 
a solution to the budget problems. It 
would only take agricultural expenditure 
out of the limelight. Retaining the Com-
munity character of agricultural policy 
remains a priority for Poland. 
The discussions on the EU budget after 
2013 should take into consideration the 
EU enlargement process and the new 
challenges related to integration and 
structural change. In this respect, CAP 
plays a decisive role, through its con-
structive character in building the com-
mon market. The future of agricultural 
policy and this part of the budget should 
consider what role this policy has in bal-
ancing regional disparities, building uni-
form terms of competition, and stabilizing 
the internal market. All these tasks can 
only be fulfilled at Community level.  
The discussion on CAP should not con-
centrate on the question of what share in 
the EU budget can be earmarked for ag-
ricultural support. Instead, the question 
to ask is what changes should be imple-
mented within CAP to make this policy 
better able to respond to social expecta-
tions and consumer needs, while remain-
ing acceptable to farmers and taxpayers. 
Radical reduction of agricultural sup-
port cannot be realistic in the light of 
further tendencies towards world trade 
liberalization. It would be perilous to re-
duce support while creating new obliga-
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tions for farmers in terms of production 
quality and veterinary conditions, espe-
cially as these terms do not apply to 
non-European competitors.  
The efficiency and scope of reforms 
and reform proposals so far have been 
limited by the fact that member-states 
have taken up negotiating positions domi-
nated by thinking in terms of net position 
(for both budget payers and beneficiar-
ies), while CAP requires actual reforms 
that serve the interest of all Europe. Let 
us not forget what enormous value is 
added to the European budget by the 
principle of solidarity.  
4) EU NEIGHBOURHOOD 
POLICY 
The EU neighbourhood policy is seen as a 
major area in the focus of the Polish po-
sition. Poland as a country with a long 
external EU border finds the maintenance 
of funds within this policy instrument es-
pecially important for two reasons: (1) 
Complying with obligations related to the 
Schengen Agreement places huge burdens 
on the national budget. (2) It is a ques-
tion of national and international security 
to help the democratization process in 
neighbouring countries. Especially impor-
tant in this respect are relations with 
Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. Poland sup-
ports maintaining good relations and 
supporting economic growth and political 
stabilization in neighbouring countries 
that will probably not be offered full 
membership status in the near future, 
but may be candidate countries later. EU 
neighbourhood policy should be shaped in 
a regional context. Warsaw hopes very 
much to continue to take an active role 
in this Community task.    
5) CONCLUSIONS 
In the light of the positive experience of 
EU membership since 2004, Poland has 
been reassured about the merits of an 
integration model based on solidarity (in 
the sense of an economic integration 
model and of foreign policy) and a free 
market, which they would like to main-
tain further. The Polish position focuses 
on three main areas: cohesion policy, the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and the EU 
neighbourhood policy. They would like to 
retain these Community instruments, al-
though Poland seems to be open to con-
structive changes in accordance with the 
new challenges facing the EU (e.g. demo-
graphic changes, sustainable development, 
or alleviating globalization affects). Dur-
ing the debate, they would propose ad-
dressing the questions of (1) which chal-
lenges the EU should try to answer, and 
(2) how current EU policies can be ad-
justed to comply with these political pri-
orities.  
Poland attachs importance to all 
expenditure items currently financed from 
the EU budget. It can be observed on the 
one hand that less affluent member-states 
would be unable to finance the cohesion-
policy or CAP commitments from their 
national budgets. However, the European 
budget has only secondary importance 
for expenditure on competitiveness (R 
and D, education) or external relations. 
Furthermore, the EU budget finances 
tasks that appear at Community level, 
aim at deepening integration in the com-
 
 
18 
mon market, and are for the sake of all 
member-states. So the revenue and ex-
penditure sides of the budget do not ex-
press mere national interests. They serve 
objectives that must be realized at a 
Community level. 
Due to the new tasks facing the EU, 
Poland would find further reduction of 
the budget unacceptable. Separation of 
the discussion on the revenue side would 
make the debate more constructive. 
Greater autonomy of the own-resources 
system would facilitate future discussion 
and allow for necessary financial devel-
opment of the new European policies.  
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